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DeFunis v. Odegaard,
416 U.S. 312 (1974)
A CASE STUDY OF THE INTERFACE BETWEEN
CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT, JUDICIAL POLITICS
AND LITIGATION STRATEGY
Marc A. Perrone, Esq*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article analyzes the litigation strategies and the
Supreme Court's decision-making process in the first voluntary
affirmative action case to reach the high court: DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). While DeFunis is most often
remembered and. cited for its contribution to the "mootness"
doctrine, the decision also contains a wealth of information as to
how the case's rich historical setting influenced the litigation
strategies of the. parties, and of the Court itself. Consequently,
DeFunis provides a rare opportunity to study the interface between
cultural development, judicial politics and litigation strategy.
In DeFunis, the plaintiff was denied admission to the
University of Washington Law School, which discriminated in its
admissions policies in favor of disadvantaged minority groups.' He
sought and obtained an injunction from Washington Superior
Court which enabled him to attend the law school.2 Defendant
Odegaard, the University president, appealed and the Washington
Supreme Court reversed.3 DeFunis then petitioned the Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari, and Justice Douglas stayed the
judgment of the Washington Supreme Court pending the United
* © 2001 Marc A. Perrone
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2 See DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 315.
3 See id.
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States Supreme Court's final disposition.4 By virtue of this stay,
DeFunis remained in law school and was in his final year by the
time the U.S. Supreme Court heard the case.
5
The historical background and setting of this case is quite
rich. When Martin Luther King was assassinated in 1968, many
institutions of higher learning responded to the national tragedy by
opening their institutions to more African-Americans and
establishing special remedial programs to tutor and then admit
them.6 These became the first voluntary affirmative action
programs at the graduate and professional school level outside the
South.
7
DeFunis was the first voluntary affirmative action case to
be granted certiorari by Supreme Court, and the nation took
notice. 8 Both the media as well as numerous legal scholars
considered it to be the most significant civil rights case since
Brown v. Board of Education.9 Literally hundreds of special
interest groups on both sides of the issue participated in the filing
of over thirty amicus curiae briefs addressing the constitutionality
of such programs. However, despite all of this interest, the
Supreme Court never reached the merits of the case, instead
finding it moot.10 As the author is confident this article will show,
this appears to be more a function of judicial politics and litigation
savvy than sound and consistent legal reasoning. This is not to
suggest an opinion on the merits either way; the Supreme Court
never addressed the merits of the issue and neither shall this article.
Instead the article's focus will be the relationship among the
cultural setting, the politics of the Supreme Court and the litigation
strategies of the parties.
4 See id.
5 See id.
6 See generally, Hon. Constance Baker Motley, Remarks At The Thurgood
Marshall Commemorative Luncheon, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 531.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Brown v. Board of Education, 237 U.S. 483 (1954).




In 1971, Marco DeFunis applied for admission as a first
year student at' the University of Washington Law School and was
denied admission." He subsequently brought a lawsuit in Wash-
ington State Supreme Court, on behalf of himself alone, claiming
that the procedures and criteria employed by the Law School
Admission Committee invidiously discriminated against him on
account of his race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.' 
2
At trial, DeFunis moved for the court to issue a mandatory
injunction requiring the University to admit him as a member of
the first-year class entering September 1971.'3 The trial court
granted DeFunis' motion finding the University's affirmative
action program unconstitutional 14 and DeFunis was accordingly
admitted to the law school in the fall of 1971.15
On appeal, however, the Washington State Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that the law
school admissions policy was constitutional. 16 At this time,
DeFunis was in his second year at the law school.' 7 The law school
immediately informed DeFunis that he would be denied
registration privileges for the second term of his second year and
that he would have to reapply for admission.' 8 In a last ditch effort
to avoid this uncertain course, DeFunis petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari. Justice Douglas, as Circuit
Justice, stayed the judgment of the Washington State Supreme
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16 Id.
17 See id.
38 See id. at 315.
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Court pending their final disposition of the case.' 9 By virtue of this
stay, DeFunis remained in law school.2°
III. THE MOOTNESS BRIEFS
DeFunis had reached the first term of his third and final
year in the fall of 1973 when the Supreme Court first considered
his petition for certiorari. 2' Given that DeFunis was in his last year
of law school, the court requested both parties to brief the
mootness issue before the Court would decide whether to grant
certiorari.22 Neither party, however, chose to argue that the case
was moot, at least not openly.
The University's mootness brief, while purporting to argue
that the case was not moot, seemed to more effectively argue that it
was indeed moot.23 For example, in the briefs Statement of Facts,
the University offered a preliminary argument addressing the
mootness issue by paraphrasing the argument which it stated to the
Washington State Supreme Court during oral arguments, where the
mootness issue was also raised.24 Essentially, this argument
contended that if the Court restored discretion to the law school,
the law school would cancel DeFunis' registration and require that
he reapply for admission.25 However, immediately following this
paraphrase of the oral argument the brief states:
The above response is the short answer to this
Court's question concerning mootness now, since
'9 See id.
20 See DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 315.
21 See id.
22 See id.
23 See Appellee's Opening Brief, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 314
(1974) (No. 73-235).
24 Appellee's Opening Brief at B5-B6, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,




all facts operative on May 15, 1972 are operative
now (October 31, 1973).26
Following this the brief goes on to state in the next paragraph:
Counsel is advised by the Dean of the Law School
(and we believe this Court should be advised) that if
Mr. DeFumis registers for the spring semester under
the existing order of this Court during the registra-
tion period from February 20, 1974 to March 1,
1974 that registration would not be canceled
unilaterally by the university regardless of the
outcome of this litigation.
27
Read together (asthey would be being only 13 lines apart),
these two statements suggest that while the case is not moot as of
October 31, 1973, it would become moot upon DeFunis' registra-
tion in late February of 1974.
As the University was likely aware, even if the Court were
to grant certiorari, there would be little or no chance of a ruling
prior to the end of registration period. In fact, it would be quite
unusual for the Court to issue an opinion before April, over a full
month after the case would admittedly become moot.
Given the proximity of these two statements to one another,
the likelihood: that their implications would be accidental and
unrecognizef by University counsel upon the proofreading of the
brief, seems extraordinary.
Accordingly, as one would likely predict, the implications
of these statements and their hypocritical inferences to the brief's
thesis was not. overlooked by the Supreme Court. In the Court's
opinion, after recognizing that the respondents' brief contended
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FN2 By contrast, in their response to the petition for
certiorari, the respondents had stated that DeFunis
would complete his third year (of law school) and
be awarded his JD degree at the end of the 1973-74
academic year, regardless of the outcome of this
appeal. [Emphasis added]
28
Apparently, the Court recognized that the University's brief
volunteered information which undermined its arguments. In fact,
it was this statement which the Court later primarily relied on in
finding that the parties lacked a live controversy, and that the case
was therefore moot.
29
The question remains however; was the offering of such
determinative information an act of litigation savvy, or instead a
litigation blunder? After all, if the University would have just stuck
to its original argument offered to the Washington State Supreme
Court: that the University would cancel DeFunis' registration
immediately upon restoration of its authority to do so, the
University would have preserved the live controversy of the case at
least until late May when DeFunis was scheduled to graduate.
In an attempt to answer this question, we must first look to
the consequences of such an addition, in an effort to identify any
benefits which would suggest a motive for the inclusion. If such a
motive is present, it would be more likely that the inclusion was
intentional. However, if no such motive could be identified, then it
would be more likely that the inclusion was a litigation blunder.
As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that DeFunis had
no interest in a denial of certiorari. If such would have happened,
the Washington State Supreme Court ruling would be restored and
the University would admittedly cancel DeFunis' registration and
require him to re-apply for admission. Clearly, this would not be in
DeFunis' interest.
It would seem to follow logically that if denial of certiorari
would be a defeat for DeFunis, then the same would be a victory
28 d. at314.
29 See DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 317.
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for the University, albeit not on the merits. In addition to DeFunis,
however, the' University too argued that the case was not moot (at
least openly)' and, consequently, for the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari. This peculiar litigation strategy hints that the Univer-
sity's objecti-Ves were more complex than that of typical
defendants, which usually surmount to the shortest path to a
dismissal. Possibly, by arguing against finding the case moot, the
University's: intention was to appear eager to litigate the case on
the merits. However substantively, the University's brief seemed to
pray for a finding of mootness and, therefore, a denial of certiorari.
Certainly, the University's interests seemed to be best
served by a denial of certiorari. Such a denial would restore the
University's authority to cancel DeFunis' registration and require
him to reapply for admission. More importantly though, it would
also allow the University's continued application of voluntary
affirmative action programs, which could be prohibited if the
Supreme Court granted certiorari and then declared such programs
unconstitutional. These advantages to arguing that the case was
moot cause one to ponder why then the University would choose to
offer an argument which would knowingly increase the odds of an
unfavorable outcome for the University. As a careful' analysis of
this peculiar posture suggests, the answer may be a combination of
political pressure and institutional pride.
To appreciate the strengths of this argument, it helps to
review the setting at the time. When Martin Luther King was
assassinated in 1968, many institutions of higher learning
responded to that national tragedy by opening their institutions to
more African; Americans and by establishing special programs to
tutor and then admit them.30 These sorts of activities, which
became known as voluntary affirmative action programs, were
wide spread by October 1973, the time when the Supreme Court
was considering DeFunis' writ of certiorari. 3'
30 See generally Hon. Constance' Baker Motley, Remarks At The Thurgood
Marshall Commemorative Luncheon, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 531.
3' See id.
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Consequently, the interest and attention placed on this case
is difficult to underestimate. Both the media as well as numerous
legal scholars considered it to be the most significant civil rights
case since Brown v. Board of Education.32 Eventually, twenty-six
amicus curiae briefs were submitted in support of the University.
Signatories to these briefs included the deans of over sixtj-four
law schools,33 the American Association of Law Schools,3 Yale
University,35 Harvard University
36 University of Pennsylvania,3
7
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 38 The American Bar
Association, 39 The NAACP,40 the United Negro College Fund
4 1
and hundreds of other organizations. Yet none of these briefs
argued that the case was moot. 2 This suggests that these influen-
tial organizations wanted a decision on the merits permitting
affirmative action programs. Hence, the pressure was on the
University to be the matriarch of the next advancement of civil
rights, and the nation was watching.
32 Brown v. Board of Education, 237 U.S. 483 (1954).
33 Amicus Curiae Brief for the Anti Defamation League of B'Nai B'rith and
the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 314 (1974) (No. 73-235).
34 Amicus Curiae Brief for the American Association of Law Schools,
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 314 (1974) (No. 73-235).
5 Amicus Curiae Brief for Yale University, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S.
312, 314 (1974) (No. 73-235).
36 Amicus Curiae Brief for Harvard University, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416
U.S. 312, 314 (1974) (No. 73-235).
37 Amicus Curiae Brief for University of Pennsylvania, DeFunis v. Odegaard,
416 U.S. 312, 314 (1974)'(No. 73-235).
8 Amicus Curiae Brief for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 314 (1974) (No. 73-235).
9 Amicus Curiae Brief for the American Bar Association, DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 314 (1974) (No. 73-235).
40 Amicus Curiae Brief for the NAACP, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,
314 (1974) (No. 73-235).
41 Amicus Curiae Brief for the United Negro College Fund, DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 314 (1974) (No. 73-235).
42 With the sole exception of Amicus Curiae Brief for the Center of Law and




If the University were to argue at this time that the case was
moot, it would likely be viewed as an act of litigation cowardice or
reluctance to argue the merits. In the greater political picture, such
could have been viewed as a sign of weakness in the movement to
preserve and promote these programs. In the University's
immediate picture, such could spell political embarrassment to the
University and the law school. This is especially true considering
the Supreme Court's historical vulnerability to the social move-
ments of the day.
Moreover, the University of Washington Law School was
then as is now, a well regarded educational institution. It stands to
reason that if it saw fit to include voluntary affirmative action
programs in its admission process, a significant portion of its
faculty believed that such programs were of considerable social
value. This, in conjunction with the natural pride and confidence
which comes- with being an esteemed university law school with
many distinguished and talented legal advocates, would likely
create an environment in favor of arguing such an important case
on the merits..
Of course, the Washington State Attorney General, not the
University Law School, was handling the litigation of this case.
However, the University's brief on the mootness issue, which
repeatedly states facts which "the law school Dean feels the Court
should be aware of,''43 demonstrates that the law school was not
merely a silent party who's interests were being advocated. Instead
the repeated focus on what "the law school Dean feels is
important" suggests that the law school, including the faculty
through their chairman the Dean, were influential in the formation
of the litigation strategy.
Admittedly, while this theory may explain why the
University felt, compelled to argue the case was not moot, it does
not explain why they would volunteer facts which undermined
their argument. One explanation for this would be a fear that such
programs are constitutionally indefensible despite their social
43 Appellee's Opening Brief at B5-B6, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,
314 (1974) (No. 73-235).
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utility. The University may have believed that though arguing that
the case was moot would be a political faux pas, a finding by the
Court that the case was moot would serve the University's interests
by allowing it to continue affirmative action programs. To the
contrary, an argument on the merits could comer the Court into
addressing the historically weak constitutional grounds for
permitting discrimination based on race. This could possibly lead
the Court to find that affirmative action programs are unconstitu-
tional. After all, up until that time the Supreme Court had risked
much of its influence by-initiating the dramatic end to segregation
caused by its courageous stance in Brown44 and the derivative end
of legal discrimination based on race. Consequently, the Court may
not be so willing to potentially undermine its progress and the
principal of racial equality under law it took this country almost
200 years and countless lives to achieve by now endorsing and
legalizing discrimination based on race, so long as the beneficiaries
were members of the formerly aggrieved class.
These opposing interests may explain the peculiarities of
the University's brief on the mootness issue. In fact, given what
they knew of the Court's thinking on the issue at the time, in
retrospect if the theories offered here are accurate, it is likely fair
to characterize the University's litigation strategy as closer to
genius, than blunder. Then again, it could just have been the mouse
that roared.
IV. THE ORAL ARGUMENTS
The oral arguments in DeFunis are much like the final
chapter in a mystery novel. They reveal many of the true struggles
and objectives that were going on within the Court concerning this
case. Moreover, just as the plot must be understood before the
conclusion can be properly analyzed, to insightfully view the
events within the oral arguments, and thereby judge the litigation
strategies of the parties, a review of the setting in which they play
out is also necessary.
44 Brown v. Board of Education, 237 U.S. 483 (1954).
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On November 19, 1973 the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to DeFunis. 45 However, it scheduled oral arguments to
take place on February 26, 1974.46 This date is significant because
it is exactly halfway through DeFunis final registration period;
beginning February 20, 1974 and ending March 2 of 1974.47
Remember, the University admitted, in its Brief on the Mootness
Issue,48 that the case would become moot once DeFunis registered
for his final law school semester because the University would not
cancel his registration after that point regardless of the outcome of
the lawsuit.
This makes this period the turning point of DeFunis' fate
and the Court's options. If DeFunis registers for his final semester,
the Court has a strong basis for finding that the case is moot. If
DeFunis fails to register, however, then his next opportunity to
register would not be until August of 1974, long after the Court's
decision is duly expected. This would mean that the Court would
loose its foundation for finding the case moot because DeFunis'
ability to register would depend on the Court's decision in this
case. The Court would likely then be cornered into a decision on
the merits since it already granted certiorari and there was no other
procedural issue.
While- a ruling on the merits may not seem like such an
undesirable resolution at first, history shows that not only was the
bench split on the issue of affirmative action, but that many of the
Justices were, not willing to commit to a permanent position
regarding the, issue.49 Although there were one or two who had
strong opinions which were not tenuous, as revealed in Justice
Marshall's personal case notes housed in the Library of Congress,
many of the Justices believed that aggressive affirmative action
programs had significant social value in the short term in order to
45 See DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 314.
46 Id. at315.
47 See Appellee's Opening Brief at B5-B6, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S.
312, 314 (1974) (No. 73-235).
48 See id.
49 See Michael Selmi, The Life of Bakke: An Affirmative Action Retrospective,
87 GEo. L.J. 981 at 991-95 (1999).
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expedite the closing of the gap between "White" and "Black"
America.50 However, these same Justices stated that their pro-
affirmative action stance was only temporary and that it should be
extinguished once it has served its purpose.51 Several Justices
actually agreed that affirmative action programs were constitu-
tionally indefensible and that the Court should "leave the
constitutional issue alone" until enough time has passed to permit
them to measure the success of these programs.5 2 Hence, the Court
felt that the issue, while passing the ripeness test required by
constitutional standing doctrines, was not ripe for the Court.
Therefore, the majority of the Court was insistent on avoiding the
merits of the case."
Given the Court's preference to avoid the constitutional
merits of the voluntary affirmative action programs, it seems that
DeFunis would have an uphill climb to say the least. In hindsight,
DeFunis may have stood the best chance by continually bringing
the Court back to the constitutional dilemma; that the United States
Supreme Court could not ignore or turn its back on the
discrimination of an individual based on his race after all of their
landmark decisions and progress in forbidding this very act. How-
ever, as the discussion of the events of the oral arguments will now
reveal, the Court tactfully established the required facts for a
finding that the case was moot, by controlling the focus and
direction of the argument.
The first ten pages of the opening statement transcript
contain DeFunis' recitation of the facts, handled by his counsel Mr.
Joseph Diamond. 54 Diamond began by establishing DeFunis'




53 See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 314 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).




University's admittance criteria.5 5  He established that the
University gave preference to minorities by establishing a quota,
and that but for this quota, DeFunis' qualifications would have
earned his admission. 6 Through this the Court advanced questions
to Diamond clarifying that DeFunis was not a member of a
minority group, and that this in turn caused the University to deny
him admission. Diamond acknowledges that such was the case. 8
Once these facts were established the Court moved the
discussion to whether DeFunis had yet registered for his final
semester.5 9 Again, this suggests the Court's awareness of how
DeFunis' failure to register could force a decision on the merits.
Diamond, however, avoids giving a direct answer, stating instead
that he is unsure if DeFunis has registered and that even if he had,
only the Court's judgment in his favor could ensure that the
University would not cancel his registration.60 The Court then
suggests that the same could be accomplished if it withheld a
ruling until after he graduated. 61 At this point, Diamond's verbal
fumbling suggests he was caught off guard.
Next, the Court instructed Diamond to find out if DeFunis
has registered for his final semester yet and to inform the Court.62
Thus, the Court's intentions become clearer by the minute.
Diamond, however, avoids acknowledging the Court's request and
seemingly begins an attempt to excuse himself from the task.63
Clearly irritated by his waffling, the Court questions why he
appears reluctant to follow their instruction." Clearly rattled,
55 See The Oral Arguments of Feb. 26, 1974 at 3-10, DeFunis v. Odegaard,
416 U.S. 312 (1974) (No. 73-235).
'6 See id. at 11.
5 See id. at 13.
5 See id.
'9 See id. at 16.
6o See The Oral Argument of Feb. 26, 1974 at 16-19, DeFunis v. Odegaard,
416 U.S. 312 (1974) (No. 73-235).
61 See id. at 19-20.
62 See id. at 16-19.
63 See id.
64 See id. at 19.
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Diamond then states that he would, however, only after the Court's
harsh tone.
65
The Court then reminds Diamond that this case is not a
class action.66 This is significant because in contrast to a class
action suit, here the Court needs only to find that DeFunis' interest
in the litigation has expired to find the issue was moot. To the
contrary, if the case was a class action suit, and any of the
plaintiffs had an interest in the litigation, the Court could not find
the issue moot. Apparently aware of this distinction, Diamond does
state that he has two other students with nearly identical claims
under his counsel.67 However, the Court then stresses that
nonetheless, DeFunis' case, as before the Bench, was not a class
action suit.
68
The Court then continues by requesting Diamond to verify
that if the Court withheld an opinion finding the case moot until
after DeFunis' graduation, that he would still qualify to take the
bar examination of Washington State.69 Diamond reluctantly
reassures the Court that he would still be permitted to sit for the
bar.7 0 The Court then informs him that he is impinging on his
rebuttal time, so he requests that the balance of his time be
reserved for rebuttal.71 Thus, he was never allowed an opportunity
to assert the constitutional question.
Arguing for the University was Mr. Slade Gordon, the
Attorney General of Washington State.72 He begins by stating that
he will disregard his planned opening statement given the Court's
obvious concern regarding the mootness issue.73 He states that he
65 See The Oral Argument of Feb. 26, 1974 at 19, DeFunis v._Odegaard, 416
U.S. 312 (1974) (No. 73-235).




70 See The Oral Argument of Feb. 26, 1974 at 20, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416
U.S. 312 (1974) (No. 73-235).
7' See id. at 24.
72 See The Oral Arguments of Feb. 26, 1974, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S.




believes the case is not moot, however, he reaffirms that the
University will not seek to remove DeFunis from the student body,
even if the Court were to affirm the Washington States Supreme
Court's decision after he has registered.74 With this the Court
utilizes the remainder of the time posing questions concerning the
law school's admissions process.
Diamond's verbal fumbling, as recorded in the Court's
transcript, strongly suggests that he was rattled by the directioh in
which the Court took the oral arguments. Understandably, he
probably expected the focus of the Court's questions to deal with
the policy concerns and constitutionality of voluntary affirmative
action programs. After all, a complete explanation of the Univer-
sity's admission process was already in the record. Furthermore,
the presumption that the merits would be the expected topic of
argument is supported by the fact that the Supreme Court granted
certiorari after the mootness' issue had been briefed. Both parties
likely reasoned that the Supreme Court must have gotten past the
mootness issue, reasoning they would not have granted certiorari if
they felt that the case was moot.
This said, Diamond still made no attempts to raise the equal
protection issue. While certainly even the savviest attorney would
understandably be somewhat nervous when addressing the
Supreme Court, such is an explanation, not a justification.
In retrospect, it. is clear that Diamond should have
petitioned the Washington Supreme Court to reclassify the case as
a class action lawsuit. This is especially true considering that he
admitted during oral arguments that he had two other students with
nearly identical claims under his counsel.76 Moreover, the Supreme
Court's request that both parties brief the mootness issue should
have been sufficient notice that the mootness issue would be of
great concern to the Court. This concern should have prompted
Diamond to move to get the case classified as a class action then.
Instead, they waited until the Supreme Court found the case moot
74 See id. at 24-27.
71 See id. at 27-32.
76 See id. at 20.
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to attain a class action certification. However, at this late date, the
Court would not grant certiorari again. Clearly, Diamond dropped
the ball in this regard.
An interesting point worth noting is that in the oral
arguments, Diamond reveals that the University was very resistant
in revealing why DeFunis was not admitted to the law school other
than to state that "other applicants were better qualified.",7 7 He
went on to state that it was not until after the lawsuit was filed and
discovery had commenced that they realized it was due to the
affirmative action program. 78 These statements raise the question
weather Diamond knew the nature and potential significance of the
case when he accepted it. Apparently, he may not have been
shopping for the perfect plaintiff to litigate the constitutionality of
affirmative action. Instead, DeFunis may have been just another
lawsuit within his practice, though surely not one he soon forgot.
To the contrary, Gordon, who submitted the University's
mootness brief which seemed so surgically crafted, and with his
quick minded decision to disregard his planed oral argument and
follow the Court's lead, appears quite the savvy litigant. Whether
his insertion of the 'registration date factor', which the Court wove
into a foundation for a mootness ruling, was by accident or design,
will likely never be known. However, in the end either luck or skill
served him well.
V. CONCLUSION
As the discussion demonstrates, the influence of politics
was quite strong in this case. From the University who abandoned
the conventional defense route of eagerly seeking dismissal at the
earliest opportunity, to the Supreme Court which abandoned its
then recent aggressive posture with regard to claims of
discrimination, politics was controlling. To the contrary, only
DeFunis sought a decision on the merits to the very end. Though
77 See The Oral Argument of Feb. 26, 1974 at 6, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416
U.S. 312 (1974) (No. 73-235).
7 See id. at 6-7.
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he failed in that respect, in the grand scheme of the litigation he
was successful in his main objective: to avoid being dismissed
from the law school. Likewise, the University too achieved its
objective by obtaining a ruling that would allow it to continue its
voluntary affirmative action program while giving the perception
that it aggressively was seeking a ruling on the merits.
Although this case failed to contribute the landmark deci-
sion in the field of constitutional law that many expected, it does
offer a valuable lesson and rare insight in the field of constitutional
litigation, an area where politics and litigation savvy match the
influence of sound and consistent legal reasoning.

